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Do democracies produce better health outcomes for children than autocracies? We argue that (1)
democratic governments have an incentive to reduce child mortality among low-income families and (2)
that media freedom enhances their ability to deliver mortality-reducing resources to the poorest. A panel
of 167 countries for the years 1961e2011 is used to test those two theoretical claims. We find that level of
democracy is negatively associated with under-5 mortality, and that that negative association is greater
in the presence of media freedom. These results are robust to the inclusion of country and year fixed
effects, time-varying control variables, and the multiple imputation of missing values.
© 2017 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.1. Introduction
Child mortality primarily occurs among the poorest members of
society in developed countries and especially developing countries
(de Looper and Lafortune, 2009; Yazbeck, 2009). Moreover, it is
often due to illnesses that are easy to prevent or treat (via, for
example, vaccination, peri- and neonatal care, access to cleanwater,
antibiotics, oral rehydration solutions, etc.). Infectious diseases
accounted for 51.8% of global deaths in children younger than five
years in 2013. The largest share of those deaths were due to
pneumonia (14.9%), diarrhea (9.2%) and malaria (7.2%) (Liu et al.,
2015). Effective interventions exist for all three diseases (Jones
et al., 2003). In addition, approximately 45% of all child deaths
were linked to undernutrition in 2011 (Black et al., 2013). This
suggests that child mortality rates among the poor could be
responsive to public policy-making.
A key determinant of public policy is regime type. Democratic
leaders must win the support of a larger share of the population
than their autocratic counterparts in order to stay in power. Thus,
they have an incentive to provide welfare-promoting resources to a
larger proportion of the population. In support of that theoreticalley), arzus@hacettepe.edu.trclaim there are a growing number of cross-national studies that
find that that democracies produce healthier, more educated and
better nourished populations than autocracies (see, for example,
Besley and Kudamatsu, 2006; Blaydes and Kayser, 2011; Brown,
1999; Gerring et al., 2012; Mackenbach et al., 2013; Patterson and
Veenstra, 2016; Wigley and Akkoyunlu, 2011). It is not immedi-
ately obvious, however, that democracies are better at promoting
the well-being of the poorest members of society. It remains
possible that democratic governments will not target welfare
transfers and public goods to low-income citizens because their
votes are not required in order to secure a winning majority. Thus,
democratic leaders may be no better at reducing child mortality
among the poor than autocratic leaders (Ross, 2006).
In response to that challenge we argue, in what follows, that
democratic leaders have a greater incentive to reduce child mor-
tality, even in those cases when they do not require the electoral
support of low-income voters (section 2.1). This is because of the
economic benefits e economies of scale, positive externalities and
enhanced productivity - associated with improved child health. In
addition, we argue that democracies are better equipped to reduce
child mortality because the greater protection they afford to free
speech, and especially media freedom, enhances government
responsiveness (section 2.2).
In order to test those two theoretical claims we employ a panel
of 167 countries (all countries with populations greater than
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country fixed effects in order to control for those unchanging fac-
tors, such as climate and colonial history, which might be simul-
taneously determining regime type and child health. We also
employ a measure of democracy that takes into account the two
central ingredients of democratic rule, political competition and
political participation. Previous studies on the link between de-
mocracy and well-being outcomes, have tended to focus on the
extent to which there are regular and genuinely competitive elec-
tions. As a consequence, they have not taken into account the de-
gree to which citizens actually participate in those elections, or
even whether there is universal suffrage. Our measure of de-
mocracy, therefore, provides a more complete picture of each
country's democratic status.
2. Theoretical framework
In this section we develop our two theoretical claims. Namely,
that democratic leaders have a greater incentive and capability to
reduce child mortality than autocratic leaders. Subsequent sections
present empirical evidence in support of those two claims.
2.1. Democracy and public goods
The survival of political leaders typically depends on their ability
to deliver benefits to their support base. This may take the form of
benefits targeted to specific individuals or groups, such as direct
payments or government contracts. Alternatively, this may take the
form of public goods such as infrastructure, health care and edu-
cation. Autocratic leaders will typically prefer to provide targeted
private goods in order to win the support of their narrow support
base. That is because it is less costly to enrich the few than to use
public goods in order to benefit everyone. However, as the required
number of backers expands it becomes increasingly more cost-
effective for political leaders to maintain support by producing
public goods. Thus, as suffrage is extended private goods represent
an increasingly smaller proportion of the benefits doled out by the
government. In other words, a transition from autocratic to dem-
ocratic rule generates a trend away from targeted private benefits
and towards public goods (Besley and Kudamatsu, 2006; Bueno de
Mesquita et al., 2005; McGuire, 2013).
Fig. 1 provides some evidence in support of that claim based on
the 39 states that underwent an unambiguous transition from
autocratic rule to democratic rule between 1960 and 2000. We use
the binary democracy variable constructed by Cheibub and
colleagues (2010) to identify those countries that have transi-
tioned to democratic rule. The bars represent the average emphasis
on public goods for each of the 39 states, for each of the 10 years
before and after transition. Our measure of the extent to which
governments prioritize public goods over targeted goods is taken
from the Varieties of Democracy Project (Coppedge et al., 2016) and
is based on the responses of multiple country experts. That project
uses cross-rater disagreement to estimate, and thereby correct for,
measurement error. As we can see there was a noticeable increase
in the extent to which those governments prioritized public goods
over targeted goods immediately after the transition year. In
addition, there is a clear increase in public goods emphasis in the
years leading up to the unambiguous transition. This is consistent
with a move towards public goods as the regime in each of those
countries began to take on more democratic characteristics.
The question is whether the increase in the production of public
goods that follows from a democratic transitionwill also benefit the
poor. The kind of publicly provided resources that would be of most
value to the worst-off (e.g. access to health practitioners, pharma-
ceuticals and teachers) may be targeted towards some voters andnot others. Thus, it remains possible that low-income voters will be
denied sufficient access to social services because they are not
required in order to win the election (Ross, 2006). Thus, it is not
immediately obvious that the greater emphasis that democracies
place on public goods will entail that they are more pro-poor than
autocracies. By extension, democratic leaders may lack an electoral
incentive to improve child health among the poorest members of
society.
We contend that democratic governments have reason to
reduce child mortality irrespective of whether they require the
support of the poorest citizens. Public goods such as health care and
education generate economies of scale, produce positive external-
ities and enhance worker productivity. Those three factors mean
that middle and upper-income voters have a vested interest in
extending access to low-income voters. Firstly, the public provi-
sioning of health and educational resources with high fixed costs,
such as hospital and school buildings, means that access can be
extended to additional citizens at low marginal cost. Secondly,
middle and upper-income voters may receive spillover benefits
from improvements in the health and education of the poorest. For
example, health interventions such as vaccinations will help to
prevent the spread of contagious diseases. Equally, providing health
care and schooling to the low-income groupmay help to reduce the
possibility of social unrest. Thirdly, and more importantly, middle
and upper-income voters may benefit from the effect of human
capital formation on economic growth (Lindert, 2004; North et al.,
2009, pp. 142e143, 266). Health care provisioning increases the
stock of human capital because healthier workers are more pro-
ductive, disease-free children tend to learn more and the incentive
to privately invest in education increases as survival rates improve
(Baird et al., 2016; Bleakley, 2007; Soares, 2005).
In a similar vein Lizzeri and Persico (2004) argue that the in-
dustrial elite in nineteenth century Britain supported spending on
preventative health measures and public education so as to mini-
mize their exposure to disease and to create a more educated labor
force. They go on to argue that it was in the self-interest of the
majority of the elite to extend the franchise during the 1800's
because it increased the likelihood of policy-making orientated
towards those kinds of public goods, rather than targeted spending.
Autocratic leaders may also wish to take advantage of the eco-
nomic benefits associated with health and education. A regime
without access to free resources (i.e. natural resource rents and
foreign aid) must rely on economic growth in order to increase the
tax revenue to be divided amongst its narrow support base (Besley
and Kudamatsu, 2008). At the same time, however, they will be
averse to investing in human capital for fear of creating a new
economic class that may ultimately threaten their grip on power
(Ansell, 2010, pp. 6e7, 9e10; Lindert, 2004, chap. 5). Autocratic
leaders without access to non-tax revenues must balance the cost
of not enabling economic growth against the risk of empowering
the low-income group. We assume, therefore, that they will typi-
cally invest less in the health and education of the low-income
group than democracies.
The upshot of this is that democratic leaders have a greater
incentive to reduce child mortality even if it turns out that they do
not require the support of the poorest in order to achieve awinning
majority. That is because their ability to obtain sufficient support
among non-poor voters may depend on their ability to deliver
mortality-averting resources to the poorest. The main implication
of this theoretical account is,
Hypothesis 1. An increase in the level of democracy will reduce the
level of under-5 mortality.
Fig. 2 presents preliminary evidence in support of this hypoth-
esis by examining the association between democratization and
Fig. 1. Public goods emphasis before and after democratic transition for 39 states, 1950e2010.
Fig. 2. Relative performance of 11 Sub-Saharan states before and after democratic transition, 1980e2010.
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between 1980 and 2010. 11 states in that region underwent an
unambiguous transition to democracy between 1990 and 2000
(Benin, Cabo Verde, Ghana, Kenya, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali,
Nigeria, Sao Tome and Principe, Senegal, and Sierra Leone). We use
the same binary variable as before to identify the transition coun-
tries. For each of those democratizing countries we subtracted the
(natural log of) under-5 mortality from the average (natural log of)
under-5 mortality for those countries in the region that remained
autocratic throughout the period. Each bar represents the average
difference for each year relative to the transition. This enables us to
compare the performance of the democratizing countries and non-
democratizing countries in the region for the 10 years before and
after the democratic transition.
As we can see the democratizing states were outperformed by
the non-democratizing states (i.e. they had a higher under-5 mor-
tality rate on average) until seven years after the transition. How-
ever, there is a clear improvement in relative performance during
the years immediately before the transition and thereafter. This is
consistent with our theoretical claim that democratization in-
creases the incentive for governments to reduce child mortality.
Significantly the graph also suggest that the pro-health effects of
democratization can emerge over a relatively short period of time
(See also, Kudamatsu, 2012). However, this result is at best sug-
gestive. The observed trend may be explained by a confounding
factor, such as economic growth, which is determining both the
level of democracy and under-5 mortality. We take steps to over-
come this and related issues in the panel data analysis that follows.
Two existing studies have shown a robust negative association
between the accumulated stock of democracy and infant mortality
(Gerring et al., 2012; McGuire, 2013). However, it has proven more
difficult to identify a negative association between the level of de-
mocracy at each point in time and infant or under-5 mortality. In
other words, it has proven difficult to establish that democratic
reforms have a positive impact on child health before those reforms
have become institutionalized. Some earlier studies did find such a
relationship (Franco, 2004; Lake and Baum, 2001; Przeworski,
2000; Zweifel and Navia, 2000). However, those studies are
affected either by selection bias because they excluded a number of
well-performing autocracies, or by omitted variable bias because
they did not control for country fixed effects (Ross, 2006). More-
over, at least four studies have found no clear relationship between
the contemporaneous level of democracy and infant or under-5
mortality (Houweling et al., 2005; Ross, 2006; Shandra et al.,
2004; Truex, 2015). One of the primary aims of this study, there-
fore, is to show that a robust negative association between the flow
of democracy and under-5 mortality pertains, provided the index of
democracy is constructed in a way that takes adequate account of
the two key ingredients of democratic rule (i.e. contestation and
participation).
2.2. Media freedom and child mortality
As a number of scholars have noted the key to improving child
health lies with the targeting of public resources, rather than
simply the magnitude of those resources (Filmer and Pritchett,
1999; Gauri and Khaleghian, 2002; McGuire, 2006). We have
already argued that democratic governments have reason to target
the low-income group even if they do not require their electoral
support. However, we contend that targeting does not completely
explain the comparative advantage of democratic governments
over their autocratic counterparts. Improving child health crucially
depends on how effectively the poor are targeted. Whether public
resources are effectively targeted towards the poor depends, in
turn, on the quality of the information available to the governmentand its citizens. Democracies are able to supply higher quality in-
formation than autocracies because they typically afford greater
protection to freedom of expression, most notably media freedom.
Media freedom helps to ensure that the right kind of resources
actually reach those that need them the most. That is because
communication openness helps to overcome two potential sources
of imperfect information. One concerns the information available to
the government, while the other concerns the information avail-
able to citizens. In the first case the government will be better
informed about the need for intervention (e.g. disease outbreak) as
well as the success of its mortality-reducing policies (e.g. whether
government policy is being properly implemented by government
officials). In this regard media freedom enhances the ability of the
government to select and implement pro-health policies. In the
second case, citizens will be better informed about the actions of
the government, such that it will be more difficult to hide policy
failure. The presence of an independent and uncensored media
means that voters are better placed to assess the government's
attempts to improve child health. The crucial role of media open-
ness in enabling human development is noted by Amartya Sen
(2009, pp. 335e337, 1999, pp. 180e181) (See also, Besley et al.,
2002).
Autocratic leaders are typically averse to allowing open
communication for fear that it will enable opposition movements
to coordinate and overthrow the government (Lohmann, 1994).
Restrictions on the flow of information enhances the ability of the
regime to prevent collective action, but it also diminishes its ability
to ascertain whether its policies are having the desired effect e in
the absence of reliable feedback the government cannot be sure
that it has selected the right policies or that low-level bureaucrats
are properly implementing the government's policies. In short,
citizens will be less informed, but so will the government. This
shortcoming of autocratic rule was explicitly acknowledged by
ChairmanMao after the devastating faminewhich killedmillions in
China between 1958 and 1961, as well as by Mikhail Gorbachev
after he became the leader of the Soviet Union in the mid-1980s
(Egorov et al., 2009, p. 645; Sen, 2009, p. 345). The upshot of this
is that, even if autocratic leaders do aim to improve child health,
they will be less able to achieve that goal than their democratic
counterparts.
Thus, the greater media freedom that typically accompanies the
process of democratization helps to ensure that public resources
are more effectively targeted towards the low-income group. This
implies the following hypothesis,
Hypothesis 2. An increase in the level of media freedom will amplify
the reductive effect of the level of democracy on under-5 mortality.
Four existing studies find that media exposure and ownership
can influence the willingness and ability of governments to provide
welfare-promoting resources. Stromberg (2004), for example, finds
that those who have access to a new mass media medium are
favored by government policy-making. Besley and Burgess (2002)
present evidence that government spending is more responsive
to droughts and floods in Indian states with a higher newspaper
circulation. Reinikka and Svensson (2005) find that the illicit cap-
ture of grants intended for primary schools in Uganda declined
markedly after the government made data on the inflow of funds to
school and district administrators available to newspapers and ra-
dio broadcasters. Finally, Djankov and colleagues (2003) find that
less public ownership of the media is associated with better public
policy outcomes. In this study we aim to complement those find-
ings by examining whether the presence of independent and un-
censored media enhances the ability of democratic governments to
reduce child mortality.
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In order to assess the two hypothesis noted above we employ a
panel of 167 countries for each year from 1961 to 2011, to analyze
the relationship between democracy and under-5 mortality. In or-
der to assess whether level of democracy (as measured by
competitive participation) influences the level of under-5 mortality
(Hypothesis 1) we employ an additive model of the following form.lnðUnder5 mortalityÞitþ1 ¼ b0 þ b1Competitive Participationit þ b2ln Хð Þit þ uitþ1 (1)In order to assess whethermedia freedom conditions the impact
of democracy on under-5 mortality (Hypothesis 2) we employ a
multiplicative model of the following form.lnðUnder5 mortalityÞitþ1 ¼ b0 þ b1Competitive Participationit þ b2Media Freedomit þ b3Competitive Participationit
Media Freedomit þ b4ln Хð Þit þ uitþ1 (2)The additive model captures the average or unconditional effect
of competitive participation on under-5 mortality, whereas the
multiplicative model captures the conditional effect of competitive
participation on under-5 mortality (i.e. the effect of competitive
participation in the presence or absence of media freedom).
For both models i is the country, t is the year and X is the set of
control variables. In order to take into account the possibility of
unmeasured country-specific factors, such as inveterately weak
state capacity, culture or climatic conditions, we include country
fixed effects. In effect this means we are examining whether
changes in the level of democracy (and media freedom) in a single
country affect the level of under-5 mortality in that country. In
addition, we include year dummies so as to take into account global
health trends. Finally, we use the one year lead of the dependent
variable to reduce endogeneity.
3.1. Dependent variable
Our measure of deprivation is the probability, per 1000 live
births, that a newborn baby will die before reaching the age of five
(under-5 mortality). Our data source for under-5 mortality is UN
Inter-Agency Group for Child Mortality Estimation (Hill et al., 2012;
UN IGME, 2016). We use under-5 mortality rather than infant
mortality because it is less likely to be affected by undercounting
(Anthopolos and Becker, 2010). We assume that it becomes
increasingly difficult to achieve a marginal decrease in under-5
mortality as its level is lowered. Moreover, the distribution of that
variable is right-skewed. Thus, in the empirical analysis that follows
we (following convention) take the natural log transformation of
the dependent variable.
3.2. Independent variables
The competitive participation variable is based on the two
defining characteristics of regime type, the competitiveness of
the political process and the extent of participation in the po-
litical process (Dahl, 1971). For the first component we rely onthe polity2 index compiled by the Polity IV project (Marshall and
Jaggers, 2016). The polity2 index is based on the extent to which
political participation is competitive, the openness and compet-
itiveness of executive recruitment, and the extent to which the
chief executive is subject to institutional constraints. Those three
components are converted into a 21-point scale for each year,
with the most autocratic countries receiving a score of 10 (e.g.
North Korea) and the most democratic countries receiving a scoreof þ10 (e.g. Japan). The polity2 index is a frequently used mea-
sure of democracy in the literature and it is probably less sus-
ceptible to measurement error than its main rivals (Coppedgeet al., 2011; Munck and Verkuilen, 2002).
For all its merits the polity2 index does have one major short-
coming. Namely, it does not take into account the proportion of the
population that is permitted to participate in the selection of public
officials (Munck and Verkuilen, 2002, p. 110). Thus, for example, the
polity2 index does not take into account the absence of universal
suffrage in South Africa before 1994 and at the federal level in
Switzerland before 1971. With that shortcoming in mind we use
electoral participation to estimate the proportion of citizens that
are permitted to participate in the political process. Our measure of
electoral participation is the proportion of the total population
voting in elections and is taken from Vanhanen (2014). The obvious
drawback of using electoral participation is that it includes voter
turnout in uncompetitive elections (e.g. elections in one-party
states).
In order to overcome the shortcomings of both these measures
of democracy, weweight the extent of electoral participation by the
degree of competitiveness in the selection of public officials. More
precisely, we multiply electoral participation by the polity2 score
divided by the maximum polity2 score of 21. The resulting regime
variable entails that electoral participation retains its full value in
those countries that are fully democratic, whereas it is weighted
downwards in those countries where there is insufficient compe-
tition in the recruitment of political leaders. This way of combining
competition and participation ensures that each is treated as
necessary and complementary ingredients of democratic rule
(Munck, 2009, pp. 48e49, 59). (In the online appendix we test
whether our results are robust to alternative ways of constructing
this variable).
For media freedom we use the dichotomous indicator of media
freedom that has been constructed by Whitten-Woodring and Van
Belle (2014). According to that index, the media environment is
classified as free if criticism of government or government officials
can and does occur and unfree if it is not possible to safely criticize
the government or government officials.
Finally, the fixed effects specification that we use helps to
mitigate any omitted variable bias. Nevertheless, it is necessary to
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neously determining the extent of democracy or media freedom as
well as the level of under-5 mortality. For that reason we include
the natural log of GDP per capita (real gross domestic product per
capita in constant 2005 dollars; Heston et al., 2012), urbanization
(share of population living in urban areas; World Bank, 2016),
trade openness (total trade as a proportion of gross domestic
product; Heston et al., 2012), and oil and gas rents (per capita in-
come from oil and gas production, in 2000 constant dollars; Ross
and Mahdavi, 2015) in order to control for wealth, economic
development, exposure to international competition, and access to
non-tax revenue (Wigley, 2017).
3.3. Data set
After constructing the data set we found that observations were
missing for a small proportion of country-years. Deleting those
cases with missing values may deprive the model of relevant in-
formation. In addition, it may bias the results if there is a systematic
difference between the observed and unobserved data (Ross,
2006). Thus, rather than applying the method of listwise deletion,
we use the Amelia multiple imputation algorithm to estimate the
missing values (Honaker et al., 2013). Using the multiple imputa-
tion process meant we were able to generate a balanced panel
composed of the 167 countries that had populations greater than
250,000 during the period 1961 to 2011. This includes those
countries that became independent during those years. In order to
ensure the robustness of our findings we also run the two models
using the original, non-imputed, data set (see section 5 below).
Detailed variable descriptions and descriptive statistics, as well as a
complete explanation of the multiple imputation process, can be
found in the online appendix. The online appendix also outlines the
adjustments that were made to the Polity IV variables for those
states that became independent from a contiguous empire, or that
emerged as a result of unification or division.
4. Results
The results of our analysis are presented in Table 1. The first
three columns present the results of the additive model and the
next two columns present the results of the multiplicative model.
The remaining columns provide robustness checks for our baseline
results.
4.1. Additive model
Does level of democracy play a role in determining the level of
under-5mortality? (Hypothesis 1) Aswe can see from column 1 our
measures of participation (electoral participation) and political
competition (polity2) are statistically significant and carry the ex-
pected sign. Unsurprisingly, therefore, our composite measure of
democracy, where electoral participation is weighted by the degree
of political competition (competitive participation), is also signifi-
cant and carries the expected sign (column 2). We also examined
the average effect of media freedom on under-5 mortality (columnlnðUnder5mortalityÞitþ1 ¼ b0 þ b1Competitive Participationit þ b2
Media Freedomit þ b5ln Хð Þit þ uitþ13). As we can see media freedom is negatively associated with
under-5 mortality, but it does not achieve statistical significance.
This is consistent with our claim thatmedia freedom does not affect
child health independently of democracy, but rather modifies the
impact of democracy. With that in mind we now turn to consider
whether media freedom conditions the reductive effect of
competitive participation on under-5 mortality.4.2. Multiplicative model
Is the salutary impact of democracy on child health dependent
on whether there are independent and uncensored media?
(Hypothesis 2) As we can see from column 4 all the variables of
interest are statistically significant. Unlike the additive model, the
coefficients for the constitutive terms do not represent the average
effect (i.e. unconditional effect) of competitive participation or
media freedom on under-5 mortality (Brambor et al., 2006, pp.
71e73). The coefficient for the constitutive term for media freedom
represents the marginal effect of that variable when the regime is
fully autocratic (e.g. North Korea). Note, however, it would be highly
unusual for a fully autocratic country to permit media freedom.
Nevertheless, the coefficient suggests that the salutary effect of
media freedom on under-5 mortality is dependent upon the pres-
ence of a sufficient level of competitive participation. The coeffi-
cient for the constitutive term for competitive participation
represents the marginal effect of that variable on under-5 mortality
when there is no media freedom. As we can see the salutary effect
of competitive participation is not dependent upon the presence of
media freedom. From the coefficient of the interaction termwe can
see that the marginal salutary effect of competitive participation on
under-5 mortality increases when media are free.
Taken together these results indicate that there is negative as-
sociation between competitive participation and under-5 mortality
when there is no media freedom, and that that negative association
is even greater when there is media freedom. That finding, com-
bined with the observation that democracies typically afford
greater protection to media freedom, suggests that they have a
comparative advantage with respect to reducing under-5 mortality.
In other words, it lends support to the claim that the greater
communication openness produced by democratic states enhances
the government's ability to improve child health.
Column 5 represents a side test for the claim underlying
Hypothesis 2. Namely, the claim that media freedom enhances the
government's ability to deliver mortality-reducing resources to the
poorest. More precisely, it examines whether the negative associ-
ation between government provisioning and under-5 mortality is
magnified in the presence of media freedom. It is important to note
that the question here is not how much the government provides,
but rather how well it targets the resources it does provide. As we
have already noted mortality-reduction largely depends on the
targeting of resources, rather than simply the extent of those re-
sources (see section 2.2). Thus, we take the magnitude of govern-
ment provisioning as given and investigate whether the impact of
those resources on under-5 mortality is conditioned by media
freedom. The model takes the following form:Media Freedomit þ b3lnðPhysiciansÞit þ b4lnðPhysiciansÞit
(3)
Table 1
Democracy, media freedom and under-5 mortality.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13)







Competitive participation 0.00359*** 0.00291*** 0.00305*** 0.00376*** 0.00307*** 0.00111*** 0.00122** 0.00359*** 0.00291*** 0.00266*** 0.00189**
(0.00104) (0.00107) (0.000988) (0.00103) (0.00106) (0.000387) (0.000464) (0.000526) (0.000792) (0.000999) (0.000910)
Media freedom 0.0104 0.0972** 0.0728** 0.102** 0.0229 0.0972*** 0.0785**
(0.0286) (0.0404) (0.0353) (0.0402) (0.0165) (0.0185) (0.0384)
Competitive participation  Media freedom 0.00275** 0.00286** 0.000314 0.00275*** 0.00232*
(0.00132) (0.00132) (0.000630) (0.000591) (0.00124)
Physicians (ln) 0.142***
(0.0367)
Physicians (ln)  Media freedom 0.0846**
(0.0423)
GDP per capita (ln) 0.390*** 0.386*** 0.392*** 0.383*** 0.362*** 0.394*** 0.390*** 0.166*** 0.166*** 0.386*** 0.383*** 0.347*** 0.343***
(0.0333) (0.0334) (0.0337) (0.0338) (0.0333) (0.0325) (0.0329) (0.0259) (0.0260) (0.0302) (0.0305) (0.0519) (0.0522)
Urbanization (ln) 0.283*** 0.263*** 0.279*** 0.244*** 0.227*** 0.234*** 0.216*** 0.0750** 0.0717** 0.263*** 0.244*** 0.331*** 0.311***
(0.0668) (0.0677) (0.0687) (0.0690) (0.0702) (0.0642) (0.0652) (0.0290) (0.0295) (0.0288) (0.0295) (0.0731) (0.0743)
Trade openness (ln) 0.0641*** 0.0613*** 0.0667*** 0.0618*** 0.0682*** 0.0616*** 0.0621*** 0.0302*** 0.0308*** 0.0613*** 0.0618*** 0.0694* 0.0695*
(0.0216) (0.0221) (0.0219) (0.0221) (0.0213) (0.0218) (0.0217) (0.0102) (0.0103) (0.0127) (0.0129) (0.0382) (0.0380)
Oil & gas rents (ln) 0.0323*** 0.0299*** 0.0323*** 0.0302*** 0.0287*** 0.0300*** 0.0303*** 0.0121*** 0.0123*** 0.0299*** 0.0302*** 0.0361*** 0.0338***
(0.00813) (0.00810) (0.00816) (0.00798) (0.00773) (0.00791) (0.00780) (0.00389) (0.00391) (0.00631) (0.00613) (0.0107) (0.0105)
Lag dependent variable 0.684*** 0.683***
(0.0386) (0.0385)






Year fixed effects ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Country fixed effects ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
World region dummies ✓ ✓
Legal origin dummies ✓ ✓
Countries 167 167 167 167 167 167 167 167 167 167 167 165 165
Years 1961e2011 1961e2011 1961e2011 1961e2011 1961e2011 1961e2011 1961e2011 1961e2011 1961e2011 1961e2011 1961e2011 1961e2011 1961e2011
Observations 8517 8517 8517 8517 8517 8517 8517 8350 8350 8517 8517 6777 6767
Notes: The dependent variable is the natural log of under-5 mortality and is measured at tþ1. Estimation strategy: Ordinary least squares. Country clustered standard errors are reported in brackets for all columns except 10 and
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inhabitants (physicians) as our indicator of government health
provisioning because data for that variable is available for each
country and for the entire period under study (World Bank, 2016).
Competitive participation is included so as to control for the pos-
sibility that the media freedom variable is merely capturing the
degree of participation and contestation. We include the same set
of time-varying control variables as before. As we can see from
column 5, media freedom magnifies the negative association be-
tween the number of physicians and under-5 mortality. This is
consistent with the claim that countries with free media are better
able to convert health-promoting resources into favorable health
outcomes. Nevertheless, this finding should be treated with a de-
gree of caution. Although data coverage for number of physicians is
greater than is the case for other provisioning indicators, it remains
the case that a high proportion of values are missing for that var-
iable (see online appendix, Table A.3).
5. Robustness checks
Fixed effects specifications are crucial as they provide a way to
control for unchanging or slow changing factors (physical geogra-
phy, culture, colonial history, etc.) that may be simultaneously
determining the main independent variables of interest and the
dependent variable, thereby producing spurious correlations.
However, that type of specification has a tendency to underesti-
mate the significance of variables that do not change or are slow
changing over time. We therefore ran the additive and multipli-
cative models without country fixed effects, but with a range of
controls for fixed factors. Those time-invariant controls are ethnic
fractionalization (Alesina et al., 2003), landlocked, temperate climate
(Gallup et al., 2010), world region, and legal origin (La Porta et al.,
1999). As we can see from columns 6 and 7, the results are very
similar to those obtained for the baseline estimations.
Columns 8 and 9 address the possibility that the right and left
hand variables of interest might lead to spurious results if they are
both highly trended. In order to control for that possibility we
included the lag of the dependent variable on the right-hand side
for both model specifications. For this model the political variables
are predicting annual changes in the dependent variable, as
opposed to the level of the dependent variable. This method for de-
trending the data produced results that are consistent with our
baseline estimations for the additive model (column 8). However,
the constitutive term for media freedom and the interaction term
lose significance when the lagged dependent variable is added to
the multiplicative model (column 9). That may be because the
dichotomous media freedom variable does not change quickly
enough to create meaningful variance on a year-to-year basis.
We also examined whether our results are affected by the
presence of spatial correlation. In this study we have used robust
standard errors clustered at the country level to correct for the
detected presence of heteroscedasticity and temporal correlation.
Pesaran's CD test did not reveal the presence of spatial correlation.
Nevertheless, we re-ran the baseline models using Driscoll-Kraay
standard errors in order to correct for that possibility. As we can
see from columns 10 and 11 this tended to improve the significance
levels of each of the coefficients, which in itself suggests the
absence of spatial dependence (Hoechle, 2007, pp. 303e304).
Finally, we examined whether our baseline results held when
the models were estimated based on the non-imputed data set.
Reassuringly, the results are very similar to the baseline estimations
suggesting that our findings are not simply an artifact of the
imputation model (see columns 12 and 13). However, we prefer to
rely on the estimations that are based on the data sets that are
produced by multiple imputation because that allows us to includemore information and to avoid the possibility of selection bias (e.g.
the listwise deletion of undemocratic countries that perform well
with respect to mortality-reduction).
In the online appendix (section A.5) we also examine whether
our results are sensitive to the way in which the competitive
participation variable is constructed. Reassuringly our results hold
when that variable is reconstructed based on adult suffrage rather
than voter turnout, as well as a more precise measure of political
competition. We also find that our baseline results hold when an
alternative indicator of media freedom is employed.
6. Discussion and conclusion
In this study we have argued that democratic governments have
a greater incentive and capability to reduce child mortality among
the poor than their autocratic counterparts. In the first place, they
have more of an incentive to pursue the economic benefits asso-
ciated with improved child health. That is, they have reason to
improve child health among the poorest even if they do not require
their votes in order to secure a winning majority. In the second
place, they are better at redirecting health-promoting resources to
the poorest because media freedom enhances government
responsiveness. In support of those two explanatory claims we
have presented robust evidence that (1) there is a negative asso-
ciation between the level of democracy and under-5 mortality, and
(2) that that negative association is greater in the presence of media
freedom. We have also presented tentative evidence that the
negative association between government health provisioning and
under-5 mortality is greater in the presence of media freedom.
These findings suggest that the extent to which the poorest citizens
are able to benefit from public policy is, at least in part, dependent
on the presence of democratic institutions and the extent to which
the government is vulnerable to criticism from independent and
uncensored media.
The results of this study are consistent with Amartya Sen's
seminal finding that a famine has a not occurred in an independent
country that is characterized by regular and competitive elections,
as well as a relatively free press (Sen, 2009, pp. 152e153). Sen's
study informs us about the ability of democratic governments to
respond to major shocks that threaten the poor, but it does not
inform us about the ability of those governments to alleviate the
ongoing suffering of the poor (e.g. child mortality, illiteracy,
malnutrition etc.) (Dreze and Sen, 1991, pp. 6e7). Thus, our study
builds upon and extends Sen's finding by showing that democratic
governments typically outperform autocratic governments when it
comes to combating endemic deprivation, as measured by under-5
mortality.
Our study also complements two existing studies that find a
robust negative association between democratic experience and
infant mortality (Gerring et al., 2012; McGuire, 2013). We find a
robust negative association between the level of democracy at each
point in time and under-5 mortality. This suggests that the salutary
effect of democratic institutions on child mortality is not wholly
dependent on the length of time in which those institutions have
been in place. This is significant as it suggests that democratic re-
forms can have a beneficial effect on child health from the outset
(see also Fig. 2).
In addition, our indicator of the level of democracy takes into
account the two central elements of democratic rule, contestation
and participation. Many of the existing studies on the link between
democracy and health rely on indicators of democratic status that
do not include electoral turnout, or even suffrage. As a result, they
do not take into account the potential importance of participation
for public health.
Finally, this study moves beyond the existing literature by
S. Wigley, A. Akkoyunlu-Wigley / Social Science & Medicine 190 (2017) 237e246 245offering direct evidence that media freedom enhances the ability of
democratic governments to reduce child mortality. This, we have
argued, is due to the fact that independent and uncensored media
improve the quality of the information available to citizens and
elected officials.
Taken together these results suggest that democratic reform - in
terms of enhanced competition, participation and media freedom -
can encourage and enable governments to implement policies that
improve child survival rates. This is significant given that a high
proportion of child deaths around the world can be prevented
through the implementation of simple and low-cost interventions.
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